Minimum coverage regulation in insurance markets View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle      Open Access: True


Article Info

DATE

2015-05-07

AUTHORS

Daniel McFadden, Carlos Noton, Pau Olivella

ABSTRACT

We study the consequences of imposing a minimum coverage in an insurance market where enrollment is mandatory and agents have private information on their true risk type. If the regulation is not too stringent, the equilibrium is separating in which a single insurer monopolizes the high risks while the rest attract the low risks, all at positive profits. Hence individuals, regardless of their type, “subsidize” insurers. If the legislation is sufficiently stringent the equilibrium is pooling, all insurers just break even and low risks subsidize high risks. None of these results require resorting to non-Nash equilibrium notions. More... »

PAGES

247-278

References to SciGraph publications

  • 2014-09-19. New Developments in the Theory of Adverse Selection in Competitive Insurance in THE GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW
  • 2010-05-04. How complex are the contracts offered by health plans? in SERIES
  • 2010-09-26. Efficiency evaluation for pooling resources in health care in OR SPECTRUM
  • 2009-02-10. Specialization and competition in healthcare delivery networks in HEALTH CARE MANAGEMENT SCIENCE
  • 2012-08-28. Wussinomics: the state of competitive efficiency in private health insurance in INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HEALTH ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT
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    http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s13209-015-0126-1

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    http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s13209-015-0126-1

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