Russell’s Repsychologising of the Proposition View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle     


Article Info

DATE

2006-07

AUTHORS

Graham Stevens

ABSTRACT

Bertrand Russell’s 1903 masterpiece The Principles of Mathematics places great emphasis on the need to separate propositions from psychological items such as thoughts. In 1919 (and until the end of his career) Russell explicitly retracts this view, however, and defines propositions as “psychological occurrences”. These psychological occurrences are held by Russell to be mental images. In this paper, I seek to explain this radical change of heart. I argue that Russell’s re-psychologising of the proposition in 1919 can only be understood against the background of his struggle with the problem of the unity of the proposition in earlier work. Once this is recognized, and the solution to the problem offered by the 1919 theory is appreciated, new light is also shed on Russell’s naturalism. I go on to compare Russell’s psychological “picture theory” with the vehemently anti-psychological picture theory of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and suggest that, once the background of the dispute is brought into clearer focus, Russell’s position can be seen to have many advantages over its more celebrated rival. More... »

PAGES

99-124

Journal

TITLE

Synthese

ISSUE

1

VOLUME

151

Author Affiliations

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1013510136


Indexing Status Check whether this publication has been indexed by Scopus and Web Of Science using the SN Indexing Status Tool
Incoming Citations Browse incoming citations for this publication using opencitations.net

JSON-LD is the canonical representation for SciGraph data.

TIP: You can open this SciGraph record using an external JSON-LD service: JSON-LD Playground Google SDTT

[
  {
    "@context": "https://springernature.github.io/scigraph/jsonld/sgcontext.json", 
    "about": [
      {
        "id": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/1701", 
        "inDefinedTermSet": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/", 
        "name": "Psychology", 
        "type": "DefinedTerm"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/17", 
        "inDefinedTermSet": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/", 
        "name": "Psychology and Cognitive Sciences", 
        "type": "DefinedTerm"
      }
    ], 
    "author": [
      {
        "affiliation": {
          "alternateName": "University of Manchester", 
          "id": "https://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.5379.8", 
          "name": [
            "Lecturer of Philosophy, Centre for Philosophy, Department of Government, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M139PL, Manchester, United Kingdom"
          ], 
          "type": "Organization"
        }, 
        "familyName": "Stevens", 
        "givenName": "Graham", 
        "type": "Person"
      }
    ], 
    "citation": [
      {
        "id": "https://doi.org/10.1080/0144534031000139237", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1014022102"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9205.00090", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1046233800"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2004.tb00979.x", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1046266303"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v1i1.1522", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1067594402"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v23i1.2036", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1067594496"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "https://doi.org/10.2307/2369948", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1069896911"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "https://doi.org/10.5840/monist19182843", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1073213430"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203449400_chapter_8", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1087789441"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }
    ], 
    "datePublished": "2006-07", 
    "datePublishedReg": "2006-07-01", 
    "description": "Bertrand Russell\u2019s 1903 masterpiece The Principles of Mathematics places great emphasis on the need to separate propositions from psychological items such as thoughts. In 1919 (and until the end of his career) Russell explicitly retracts this view, however, and defines propositions as \u201cpsychological occurrences\u201d. These psychological occurrences are held by Russell to be mental images. In this paper, I seek to explain this radical change of heart. I argue that Russell\u2019s re-psychologising of the proposition in 1919 can only be understood against the background of his struggle with the problem of the unity of the proposition in earlier work. Once this is recognized, and the solution to the problem offered by the 1919 theory is appreciated, new light is also shed on Russell\u2019s naturalism. I go on to compare Russell\u2019s psychological \u201cpicture theory\u201d with the vehemently anti-psychological picture theory of Wittgenstein\u2019s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and suggest that, once the background of the dispute is brought into clearer focus, Russell\u2019s position can be seen to have many advantages over its more celebrated rival.", 
    "genre": "research_article", 
    "id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1", 
    "inLanguage": [
      "en"
    ], 
    "isAccessibleForFree": false, 
    "isPartOf": [
      {
        "id": "sg:journal.1284232", 
        "issn": [
          "0039-7857", 
          "1573-0964"
        ], 
        "name": "Synthese", 
        "type": "Periodical"
      }, 
      {
        "issueNumber": "1", 
        "type": "PublicationIssue"
      }, 
      {
        "type": "PublicationVolume", 
        "volumeNumber": "151"
      }
    ], 
    "name": "Russell\u2019s Repsychologising of the Proposition", 
    "pagination": "99-124", 
    "productId": [
      {
        "name": "readcube_id", 
        "type": "PropertyValue", 
        "value": [
          "405c177134cb64683b22937e2f6c158d9aab73e31143d2255e14c1eb1044e5fc"
        ]
      }, 
      {
        "name": "doi", 
        "type": "PropertyValue", 
        "value": [
          "10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1"
        ]
      }, 
      {
        "name": "dimensions_id", 
        "type": "PropertyValue", 
        "value": [
          "pub.1013510136"
        ]
      }
    ], 
    "sameAs": [
      "https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1", 
      "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1013510136"
    ], 
    "sdDataset": "articles", 
    "sdDatePublished": "2019-04-11T00:18", 
    "sdLicense": "https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/", 
    "sdPublisher": {
      "name": "Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project", 
      "type": "Organization"
    }, 
    "sdSource": "s3://com-uberresearch-data-dimensions-target-20181106-alternative/cleanup/v134/2549eaecd7973599484d7c17b260dba0a4ecb94b/merge/v9/a6c9fde33151104705d4d7ff012ea9563521a3ce/jats-lookup/v90/0000000001_0000000264/records_8695_00000521.jsonl", 
    "type": "ScholarlyArticle", 
    "url": "http://link.springer.com/10.1007%2Fs11229-004-2246-1"
  }
]
 

Download the RDF metadata as:  json-ld nt turtle xml License info

HOW TO GET THIS DATA PROGRAMMATICALLY:

JSON-LD is a popular format for linked data which is fully compatible with JSON.

curl -H 'Accept: application/ld+json' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1'

N-Triples is a line-based linked data format ideal for batch operations.

curl -H 'Accept: application/n-triples' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1'

Turtle is a human-readable linked data format.

curl -H 'Accept: text/turtle' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1'

RDF/XML is a standard XML format for linked data.

curl -H 'Accept: application/rdf+xml' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1'


 

This table displays all metadata directly associated to this object as RDF triples.

84 TRIPLES      21 PREDICATES      35 URIs      19 LITERALS      7 BLANK NODES

Subject Predicate Object
1 sg:pub.10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1 schema:about anzsrc-for:17
2 anzsrc-for:1701
3 schema:author N647aae70242a4166997b7019e238fea7
4 schema:citation https://doi.org/10.1080/0144534031000139237
5 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9205.00090
6 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2004.tb00979.x
7 https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v1i1.1522
8 https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v23i1.2036
9 https://doi.org/10.2307/2369948
10 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203449400_chapter_8
11 https://doi.org/10.5840/monist19182843
12 schema:datePublished 2006-07
13 schema:datePublishedReg 2006-07-01
14 schema:description Bertrand Russell’s 1903 masterpiece The Principles of Mathematics places great emphasis on the need to separate propositions from psychological items such as thoughts. In 1919 (and until the end of his career) Russell explicitly retracts this view, however, and defines propositions as “psychological occurrences”. These psychological occurrences are held by Russell to be mental images. In this paper, I seek to explain this radical change of heart. I argue that Russell’s re-psychologising of the proposition in 1919 can only be understood against the background of his struggle with the problem of the unity of the proposition in earlier work. Once this is recognized, and the solution to the problem offered by the 1919 theory is appreciated, new light is also shed on Russell’s naturalism. I go on to compare Russell’s psychological “picture theory” with the vehemently anti-psychological picture theory of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and suggest that, once the background of the dispute is brought into clearer focus, Russell’s position can be seen to have many advantages over its more celebrated rival.
15 schema:genre research_article
16 schema:inLanguage en
17 schema:isAccessibleForFree false
18 schema:isPartOf N278a09060b3e475f93db5a35d9c48aaf
19 Naf687985f5644bb2974620ccb864cbba
20 sg:journal.1284232
21 schema:name Russell’s Repsychologising of the Proposition
22 schema:pagination 99-124
23 schema:productId N4ad25a0513e2406b9870605594dfc48a
24 Ne700070f34d24bce9f687aacfb799bf9
25 Neabc75d51d5a4843b4e7124def86c106
26 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1013510136
27 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1
28 schema:sdDatePublished 2019-04-11T00:18
29 schema:sdLicense https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/
30 schema:sdPublisher N429e6c57fcab4838a346585124f61025
31 schema:url http://link.springer.com/10.1007%2Fs11229-004-2246-1
32 sgo:license sg:explorer/license/
33 sgo:sdDataset articles
34 rdf:type schema:ScholarlyArticle
35 N278a09060b3e475f93db5a35d9c48aaf schema:volumeNumber 151
36 rdf:type schema:PublicationVolume
37 N429e6c57fcab4838a346585124f61025 schema:name Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project
38 rdf:type schema:Organization
39 N4ad25a0513e2406b9870605594dfc48a schema:name doi
40 schema:value 10.1007/s11229-004-2246-1
41 rdf:type schema:PropertyValue
42 N647aae70242a4166997b7019e238fea7 rdf:first Nfa28d81b141d429e8af0d9dd9532f1aa
43 rdf:rest rdf:nil
44 Naf687985f5644bb2974620ccb864cbba schema:issueNumber 1
45 rdf:type schema:PublicationIssue
46 Ne700070f34d24bce9f687aacfb799bf9 schema:name dimensions_id
47 schema:value pub.1013510136
48 rdf:type schema:PropertyValue
49 Neabc75d51d5a4843b4e7124def86c106 schema:name readcube_id
50 schema:value 405c177134cb64683b22937e2f6c158d9aab73e31143d2255e14c1eb1044e5fc
51 rdf:type schema:PropertyValue
52 Nfa28d81b141d429e8af0d9dd9532f1aa schema:affiliation https://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.5379.8
53 schema:familyName Stevens
54 schema:givenName Graham
55 rdf:type schema:Person
56 anzsrc-for:17 schema:inDefinedTermSet anzsrc-for:
57 schema:name Psychology and Cognitive Sciences
58 rdf:type schema:DefinedTerm
59 anzsrc-for:1701 schema:inDefinedTermSet anzsrc-for:
60 schema:name Psychology
61 rdf:type schema:DefinedTerm
62 sg:journal.1284232 schema:issn 0039-7857
63 1573-0964
64 schema:name Synthese
65 rdf:type schema:Periodical
66 https://doi.org/10.1080/0144534031000139237 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1014022102
67 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
68 https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9205.00090 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1046233800
69 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
70 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1755-2567.2004.tb00979.x schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1046266303
71 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
72 https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v1i1.1522 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1067594402
73 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
74 https://doi.org/10.15173/russell.v23i1.2036 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1067594496
75 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
76 https://doi.org/10.2307/2369948 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1069896911
77 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
78 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203449400_chapter_8 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1087789441
79 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
80 https://doi.org/10.5840/monist19182843 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1073213430
81 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
82 https://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.5379.8 schema:alternateName University of Manchester
83 schema:name Lecturer of Philosophy, Centre for Philosophy, Department of Government, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M139PL, Manchester, United Kingdom
84 rdf:type schema:Organization
 




Preview window. Press ESC to close (or click here)


...