Advice for fallibilists: put knowledge to work View Full Text


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Article Info

DATE

2009-01

AUTHORS

Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath

ABSTRACT

We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chance that not p” and “p but it there’s a chance that not p.” We argue that the best defense of fallibilism against this objection—a “pragmatist” defense—makes the following claims. First, while knowledge that p is compatible with an epistemic chance that not-p, it is compatible only with an insignificant such chance. Second, the insignificance of the chance that not-p is plausibly understood in terms of the irrelevance of that chance to p’s serving as a ‘justifier’, for action as well as belief. In other words, if you know that p, then any chance for you that not p doesn’t stand in the way of p’s being properly put to work as a basis for action and belief. More... »

PAGES

55-66

References to SciGraph publications

  • 2002-01. How to Think about Fallibilism in PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
  • Identifiers

    URI

    http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s11098-008-9303-4

    DOI

    http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-008-9303-4

    DIMENSIONS

    https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1041676344


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