Stackelberg Strategies for Selfish Routing in General Multicommodity Networks View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle      Open Access: True


Article Info

DATE

2009-01

AUTHORS

George Karakostas, Stavros G. Kolliopoulos

ABSTRACT

A natural generalization of the selfish routing setting arises when some of the users obey a central coordinating authority, while the rest act selfishly. Such behavior can be modeled by dividing the users into an α fraction that are routed according to the central coordinator’s routing strategy (Stackelberg strategy), and the remaining 1−α that determine their strategy selfishly, given the routing of the coordinated users. One seeks to quantify the resulting price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio of the cost of the worst traffic equilibrium to the system optimum, as a function of α. It is well-known that for α=0 and linear latency functions the price of anarchy is at most 4/3 (J. ACM 49, 236–259, 2002). If α tends to 1, the price of anarchy should also tend to 1 for any reasonable algorithm used by the coordinator. We analyze two such algorithms for Stackelberg routing, LLF and SCALE. For general topology networks, multicommodity users, and linear latency functions, we show a price of anarchy bound for SCALE which decreases from 4/3 to 1 as α increases from 0 to 1, and depends only on α. Up to this work, such a tradeoff was known only for the case of two nodes connected with parallel links (SIAM J. Comput. 33, 332–350, 2004), while for general networks it was not clear whether such a result could be achieved, even in the single-commodity case. We show a weaker bound for LLF and also some extensions to general latency functions. The existence of a central coordinator is a rather strong requirement for a network. We show that we can do away with such a coordinator, as long as we are allowed to impose taxes (tolls) on the edges in order to steer the selfish users towards an improved system cost. As long as there is at least a fraction α of users that pay their taxes, we show the existence of taxes that lead to the simulation of SCALE by the tax-payers. The extension of the results mentioned above quantifies the improvement on the system cost as the number of tax-evaders decreases. More... »

PAGES

132-153

References to SciGraph publications

  • 2002-04-12. Worst-Case Equilibria in STACS 99
  • 2004. The Price of Anarchy when Costs Are Non-separable and Asymmetric in INTEGER PROGRAMMING AND COMBINATORIAL OPTIMIZATION
  • 1996-12. A convergence analysis for a convex version of Dikin's algorithm in ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH
  • Identifiers

    URI

    http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00453-007-9018-5

    DOI

    http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00453-007-9018-5

    DIMENSIONS

    https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1033706914


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