Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle     


Article Info

DATE

1996-12

AUTHORS

James Schummer

ABSTRACT

Strategy-proofness has been shown to be a strong property, particularly on large domains of preferences. We therefore examine the existence of strategy-proof and efficient solutions on restricted, 2-person domains of exchange economies. On the class of 2-person exchange economies in which agents have homothetic, strictly convex preferences we show, as Zhou (1991) did for a larger domain, that such a solution is necessarily dictatorial. As this proof requires preferences exhibiting high degrees of complementarity, our search continues to a class of linear preferences. Even on this “small” domain, the same negative result holds. These two results are extended to many superdomains, including Zhou’s. More... »

PAGES

47-56

Journal

TITLE

Social Choice and Welfare

ISSUE

1

VOLUME

14

Author Affiliations

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s003550050050

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050050

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1050658135


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