Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle     


Article Info

DATE

1996-12

AUTHORS

James Schummer

ABSTRACT

Strategy-proofness has been shown to be a strong property, particularly on large domains of preferences. We therefore examine the existence of strategy-proof and efficient solutions on restricted, 2-person domains of exchange economies. On the class of 2-person exchange economies in which agents have homothetic, strictly convex preferences we show, as Zhou (1991) did for a larger domain, that such a solution is necessarily dictatorial. As this proof requires preferences exhibiting high degrees of complementarity, our search continues to a class of linear preferences. Even on this “small” domain, the same negative result holds. These two results are extended to many superdomains, including Zhou’s. More... »

PAGES

47-56

Journal

TITLE

Social Choice and Welfare

ISSUE

1

VOLUME

14

Author Affiliations

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s003550050050

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s003550050050

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1050658135


Indexing Status Check whether this publication has been indexed by Scopus and Web Of Science using the SN Indexing Status Tool
Incoming Citations Browse incoming citations for this publication using opencitations.net

JSON-LD is the canonical representation for SciGraph data.

TIP: You can open this SciGraph record using an external JSON-LD service: JSON-LD Playground Google SDTT

[
  {
    "@context": "https://springernature.github.io/scigraph/jsonld/sgcontext.json", 
    "about": [
      {
        "id": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/1402", 
        "inDefinedTermSet": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/", 
        "name": "Applied Economics", 
        "type": "DefinedTerm"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/14", 
        "inDefinedTermSet": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/", 
        "name": "Economics", 
        "type": "DefinedTerm"
      }
    ], 
    "author": [
      {
        "affiliation": {
          "alternateName": "University of Rochester", 
          "id": "https://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.16416.34", 
          "name": [
            "Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA, US"
          ], 
          "type": "Organization"
        }, 
        "familyName": "Schummer", 
        "givenName": "James", 
        "type": "Person"
      }
    ], 
    "datePublished": "1996-12", 
    "datePublishedReg": "1996-12-01", 
    "description": "Strategy-proofness has been shown to be a strong property, particularly on large domains of preferences. We therefore examine the existence of strategy-proof and efficient solutions on restricted, 2-person domains of exchange economies. On the class of 2-person exchange economies in which agents have homothetic, strictly convex preferences we show, as Zhou (1991) did for a larger domain, that such a solution is necessarily dictatorial. As this proof requires preferences exhibiting high degrees of complementarity, our search continues to a class of linear preferences. Even on this \u201csmall\u201d domain, the same negative result holds. These two results are extended to many superdomains, including Zhou\u2019s.", 
    "genre": "research_article", 
    "id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s003550050050", 
    "inLanguage": [
      "en"
    ], 
    "isAccessibleForFree": false, 
    "isPartOf": [
      {
        "id": "sg:journal.1028302", 
        "issn": [
          "0176-1714", 
          "1432-217X"
        ], 
        "name": "Social Choice and Welfare", 
        "type": "Periodical"
      }, 
      {
        "issueNumber": "1", 
        "type": "PublicationIssue"
      }, 
      {
        "type": "PublicationVolume", 
        "volumeNumber": "14"
      }
    ], 
    "name": "Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies", 
    "pagination": "47-56", 
    "productId": [
      {
        "name": "readcube_id", 
        "type": "PropertyValue", 
        "value": [
          "f151531cd5c8718494b0f05f5911bf46b5c88f8341876cd17cda585c157daf65"
        ]
      }, 
      {
        "name": "doi", 
        "type": "PropertyValue", 
        "value": [
          "10.1007/s003550050050"
        ]
      }, 
      {
        "name": "dimensions_id", 
        "type": "PropertyValue", 
        "value": [
          "pub.1050658135"
        ]
      }
    ], 
    "sameAs": [
      "https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050050", 
      "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1050658135"
    ], 
    "sdDataset": "articles", 
    "sdDatePublished": "2019-04-10T17:25", 
    "sdLicense": "https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/", 
    "sdPublisher": {
      "name": "Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project", 
      "type": "Organization"
    }, 
    "sdSource": "s3://com-uberresearch-data-dimensions-target-20181106-alternative/cleanup/v134/2549eaecd7973599484d7c17b260dba0a4ecb94b/merge/v9/a6c9fde33151104705d4d7ff012ea9563521a3ce/jats-lookup/v90/0000000001_0000000264/records_8672_00000483.jsonl", 
    "type": "ScholarlyArticle", 
    "url": "http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s003550050050"
  }
]
 

Download the RDF metadata as:  json-ld nt turtle xml License info

HOW TO GET THIS DATA PROGRAMMATICALLY:

JSON-LD is a popular format for linked data which is fully compatible with JSON.

curl -H 'Accept: application/ld+json' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s003550050050'

N-Triples is a line-based linked data format ideal for batch operations.

curl -H 'Accept: application/n-triples' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s003550050050'

Turtle is a human-readable linked data format.

curl -H 'Accept: text/turtle' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s003550050050'

RDF/XML is a standard XML format for linked data.

curl -H 'Accept: application/rdf+xml' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s003550050050'


 

This table displays all metadata directly associated to this object as RDF triples.

60 TRIPLES      20 PREDICATES      27 URIs      19 LITERALS      7 BLANK NODES

Subject Predicate Object
1 sg:pub.10.1007/s003550050050 schema:about anzsrc-for:14
2 anzsrc-for:1402
3 schema:author N7d4f5e53d91e4b049b6b8ae25ded5be9
4 schema:datePublished 1996-12
5 schema:datePublishedReg 1996-12-01
6 schema:description Strategy-proofness has been shown to be a strong property, particularly on large domains of preferences. We therefore examine the existence of strategy-proof and efficient solutions on restricted, 2-person domains of exchange economies. On the class of 2-person exchange economies in which agents have homothetic, strictly convex preferences we show, as Zhou (1991) did for a larger domain, that such a solution is necessarily dictatorial. As this proof requires preferences exhibiting high degrees of complementarity, our search continues to a class of linear preferences. Even on this “small” domain, the same negative result holds. These two results are extended to many superdomains, including Zhou’s.
7 schema:genre research_article
8 schema:inLanguage en
9 schema:isAccessibleForFree false
10 schema:isPartOf N19d17b331ee54a1fb7604d182df32783
11 N589e981ae959407c99d35579642053c4
12 sg:journal.1028302
13 schema:name Strategy-proofness versus efficiency on restricted domains of exchange economies
14 schema:pagination 47-56
15 schema:productId N369cb38a56fe40b7a7d08e6e4015caa3
16 Nb5784fd945ef4659b585c58a5548225a
17 Nd80fb3b5b8a9416b803daea5700c90a7
18 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1050658135
19 https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050050
20 schema:sdDatePublished 2019-04-10T17:25
21 schema:sdLicense https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/
22 schema:sdPublisher Nf0f57095030040c6b288eefedf848994
23 schema:url http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s003550050050
24 sgo:license sg:explorer/license/
25 sgo:sdDataset articles
26 rdf:type schema:ScholarlyArticle
27 N19d17b331ee54a1fb7604d182df32783 schema:issueNumber 1
28 rdf:type schema:PublicationIssue
29 N2e29c241938f42d1ae2c3a01ac56318c schema:affiliation https://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.16416.34
30 schema:familyName Schummer
31 schema:givenName James
32 rdf:type schema:Person
33 N369cb38a56fe40b7a7d08e6e4015caa3 schema:name dimensions_id
34 schema:value pub.1050658135
35 rdf:type schema:PropertyValue
36 N589e981ae959407c99d35579642053c4 schema:volumeNumber 14
37 rdf:type schema:PublicationVolume
38 N7d4f5e53d91e4b049b6b8ae25ded5be9 rdf:first N2e29c241938f42d1ae2c3a01ac56318c
39 rdf:rest rdf:nil
40 Nb5784fd945ef4659b585c58a5548225a schema:name doi
41 schema:value 10.1007/s003550050050
42 rdf:type schema:PropertyValue
43 Nd80fb3b5b8a9416b803daea5700c90a7 schema:name readcube_id
44 schema:value f151531cd5c8718494b0f05f5911bf46b5c88f8341876cd17cda585c157daf65
45 rdf:type schema:PropertyValue
46 Nf0f57095030040c6b288eefedf848994 schema:name Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project
47 rdf:type schema:Organization
48 anzsrc-for:14 schema:inDefinedTermSet anzsrc-for:
49 schema:name Economics
50 rdf:type schema:DefinedTerm
51 anzsrc-for:1402 schema:inDefinedTermSet anzsrc-for:
52 schema:name Applied Economics
53 rdf:type schema:DefinedTerm
54 sg:journal.1028302 schema:issn 0176-1714
55 1432-217X
56 schema:name Social Choice and Welfare
57 rdf:type schema:Periodical
58 https://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.16416.34 schema:alternateName University of Rochester
59 schema:name Department of Economics, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627, USA, US
60 rdf:type schema:Organization
 




Preview window. Press ESC to close (or click here)


...