Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle      Open Access: True


Article Info

DATE

2019-03-28

AUTHORS

Bo Chen, Yu Chen, David Rietzke

ABSTRACT

We consider a general framework for multitask moral hazard problems with observable and hidden actions. Ideally, the principal in our framework can design optimal contracts that depend on both observable (and verifiable) actions and realized outcomes. Given a mild assumption on the existence of a punishment scheme, we identify a general equivalence result, dubbed the “forcing principle,” which states that every optimal contract in our framework is strategically equivalent to a simple forcing contract, which only specifies an outcome-contingent reward scheme and an action profile, and the agent receives the outcome-contingent reward only if he follows the recommended observable actions (and is otherwise punished severely). The forcing principle has useful implications: it confers analytical advantage for the existence and computation of optimal contracts in our setting. It also highlights and makes explicit the importance of the existence of the punishment scheme in characterizing first-best benchmarks in moral hazard problems. More... »

PAGES

1023-1047

References to SciGraph publications

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1113061682


Indexing Status Check whether this publication has been indexed by Scopus and Web Of Science using the SN Indexing Status Tool
Incoming Citations Browse incoming citations for this publication using opencitations.net

JSON-LD is the canonical representation for SciGraph data.

TIP: You can open this SciGraph record using an external JSON-LD service: JSON-LD Playground Google SDTT

[
  {
    "@context": "https://springernature.github.io/scigraph/jsonld/sgcontext.json", 
    "about": [
      {
        "id": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/14", 
        "inDefinedTermSet": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/", 
        "name": "Economics", 
        "type": "DefinedTerm"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/1402", 
        "inDefinedTermSet": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/", 
        "name": "Applied Economics", 
        "type": "DefinedTerm"
      }
    ], 
    "author": [
      {
        "affiliation": {
          "alternateName": "Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, USA", 
          "id": "http://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.263864.d", 
          "name": [
            "Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, USA"
          ], 
          "type": "Organization"
        }, 
        "familyName": "Chen", 
        "givenName": "Bo", 
        "type": "Person"
      }, 
      {
        "affiliation": {
          "alternateName": "Department of Economics, University of Graz, Graz, Austria", 
          "id": "http://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.5110.5", 
          "name": [
            "Department of Economics, University of Graz, Graz, Austria"
          ], 
          "type": "Organization"
        }, 
        "familyName": "Chen", 
        "givenName": "Yu", 
        "id": "sg:person.012655450625.49", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/discover/publication?and_facet_researcher=ur.012655450625.49"
        ], 
        "type": "Person"
      }, 
      {
        "affiliation": {
          "alternateName": "Department of Economics, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK", 
          "id": "http://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.9835.7", 
          "name": [
            "Department of Economics, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK"
          ], 
          "type": "Organization"
        }, 
        "familyName": "Rietzke", 
        "givenName": "David", 
        "id": "sg:person.011734031152.73", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/discover/publication?and_facet_researcher=ur.011734031152.73"
        ], 
        "type": "Person"
      }
    ], 
    "citation": [
      {
        "id": "sg:pub.10.1007/bf01229312", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1031238892", 
          "https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01229312"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "sg:pub.10.1007/978-1-349-01989-2_14", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1007745717", 
          "https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01989-2_14"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "sg:pub.10.1007/bf01212474", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1007766849", 
          "https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212474"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "sg:pub.10.1007/bf01211443", 
        "sameAs": [
          "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1027283872", 
          "https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01211443"
        ], 
        "type": "CreativeWork"
      }
    ], 
    "datePublished": "2019-03-28", 
    "datePublishedReg": "2019-03-28", 
    "description": "We consider a general framework for multitask moral hazard problems with observable and hidden actions. Ideally, the principal in our framework can design optimal contracts that depend on both observable (and verifiable) actions and realized outcomes. Given a mild assumption on the existence of a punishment scheme, we identify a general equivalence result, dubbed the \u201cforcing principle,\u201d which states that every optimal contract in our framework is strategically equivalent to a simple forcing contract, which only specifies an outcome-contingent reward scheme and an action profile, and the agent receives the outcome-contingent reward only if he follows the recommended observable actions (and is otherwise punished severely). The forcing principle has useful implications: it confers analytical advantage for the existence and computation of optimal contracts in our setting. It also highlights and makes explicit the importance of the existence of the punishment scheme in characterizing first-best benchmarks in moral hazard problems.", 
    "genre": "article", 
    "id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7", 
    "inLanguage": "en", 
    "isAccessibleForFree": true, 
    "isFundedItemOf": [
      {
        "id": "sg:grant.8325078", 
        "type": "MonetaryGrant"
      }
    ], 
    "isPartOf": [
      {
        "id": "sg:journal.1136838", 
        "issn": [
          "0938-2259", 
          "1432-0479"
        ], 
        "name": "Economic Theory", 
        "publisher": "Springer Nature", 
        "type": "Periodical"
      }, 
      {
        "issueNumber": "4", 
        "type": "PublicationIssue"
      }, 
      {
        "type": "PublicationVolume", 
        "volumeNumber": "69"
      }
    ], 
    "keywords": [
      "general equivalence result", 
      "mild assumptions", 
      "general framework", 
      "equivalence result", 
      "moral hazard problem", 
      "optimal contract", 
      "scheme", 
      "good benchmark", 
      "hazard problem", 
      "existence", 
      "hidden actions", 
      "problem", 
      "punishment scheme", 
      "computation", 
      "simple contracts", 
      "framework", 
      "observable actions", 
      "principles", 
      "contracts", 
      "assumption", 
      "reward schemes", 
      "useful implications", 
      "action profile", 
      "benchmarks", 
      "analytical advantages", 
      "advantages", 
      "results", 
      "reward", 
      "implications", 
      "profile", 
      "principals", 
      "action", 
      "importance", 
      "setting", 
      "outcomes", 
      "agents", 
      "multitask moral hazard problems", 
      "simple forcing contract", 
      "forcing contract", 
      "outcome-contingent reward scheme", 
      "outcome-contingent reward"
    ], 
    "name": "Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions", 
    "pagination": "1023-1047", 
    "productId": [
      {
        "name": "dimensions_id", 
        "type": "PropertyValue", 
        "value": [
          "pub.1113061682"
        ]
      }, 
      {
        "name": "doi", 
        "type": "PropertyValue", 
        "value": [
          "10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7"
        ]
      }
    ], 
    "sameAs": [
      "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7", 
      "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1113061682"
    ], 
    "sdDataset": "articles", 
    "sdDatePublished": "2021-12-01T19:45", 
    "sdLicense": "https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/", 
    "sdPublisher": {
      "name": "Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project", 
      "type": "Organization"
    }, 
    "sdSource": "s3://com-springernature-scigraph/baseset/20211201/entities/gbq_results/article/article_825.jsonl", 
    "type": "ScholarlyArticle", 
    "url": "https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7"
  }
]
 

Download the RDF metadata as:  json-ld nt turtle xml License info

HOW TO GET THIS DATA PROGRAMMATICALLY:

JSON-LD is a popular format for linked data which is fully compatible with JSON.

curl -H 'Accept: application/ld+json' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7'

N-Triples is a line-based linked data format ideal for batch operations.

curl -H 'Accept: application/n-triples' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7'

Turtle is a human-readable linked data format.

curl -H 'Accept: text/turtle' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7'

RDF/XML is a standard XML format for linked data.

curl -H 'Accept: application/rdf+xml' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7'


 

This table displays all metadata directly associated to this object as RDF triples.

136 TRIPLES      22 PREDICATES      70 URIs      58 LITERALS      6 BLANK NODES

Subject Predicate Object
1 sg:pub.10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7 schema:about anzsrc-for:14
2 anzsrc-for:1402
3 schema:author N1e389cd42ae44084a8e9ec5d6db2bcbc
4 schema:citation sg:pub.10.1007/978-1-349-01989-2_14
5 sg:pub.10.1007/bf01211443
6 sg:pub.10.1007/bf01212474
7 sg:pub.10.1007/bf01229312
8 schema:datePublished 2019-03-28
9 schema:datePublishedReg 2019-03-28
10 schema:description We consider a general framework for multitask moral hazard problems with observable and hidden actions. Ideally, the principal in our framework can design optimal contracts that depend on both observable (and verifiable) actions and realized outcomes. Given a mild assumption on the existence of a punishment scheme, we identify a general equivalence result, dubbed the “forcing principle,” which states that every optimal contract in our framework is strategically equivalent to a simple forcing contract, which only specifies an outcome-contingent reward scheme and an action profile, and the agent receives the outcome-contingent reward only if he follows the recommended observable actions (and is otherwise punished severely). The forcing principle has useful implications: it confers analytical advantage for the existence and computation of optimal contracts in our setting. It also highlights and makes explicit the importance of the existence of the punishment scheme in characterizing first-best benchmarks in moral hazard problems.
11 schema:genre article
12 schema:inLanguage en
13 schema:isAccessibleForFree true
14 schema:isPartOf N2ddce14c9cd64985a9147e3c036277f9
15 Ne06562eb0b9a4aecb7b1438abb743978
16 sg:journal.1136838
17 schema:keywords action
18 action profile
19 advantages
20 agents
21 analytical advantages
22 assumption
23 benchmarks
24 computation
25 contracts
26 equivalence result
27 existence
28 forcing contract
29 framework
30 general equivalence result
31 general framework
32 good benchmark
33 hazard problem
34 hidden actions
35 implications
36 importance
37 mild assumptions
38 moral hazard problem
39 multitask moral hazard problems
40 observable actions
41 optimal contract
42 outcome-contingent reward
43 outcome-contingent reward scheme
44 outcomes
45 principals
46 principles
47 problem
48 profile
49 punishment scheme
50 results
51 reward
52 reward schemes
53 scheme
54 setting
55 simple contracts
56 simple forcing contract
57 useful implications
58 schema:name Simple contracts under observable and hidden actions
59 schema:pagination 1023-1047
60 schema:productId N22247a7d628b49a8b509049ac8a69b3d
61 N6a45f38a1d6446f084bff9f9c04c3ab3
62 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1113061682
63 https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7
64 schema:sdDatePublished 2021-12-01T19:45
65 schema:sdLicense https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/
66 schema:sdPublisher N0b2effb21144418cb8397355301f2b86
67 schema:url https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7
68 sgo:license sg:explorer/license/
69 sgo:sdDataset articles
70 rdf:type schema:ScholarlyArticle
71 N0a00437ee04147019e6a04dcbf9b1bba rdf:first sg:person.011734031152.73
72 rdf:rest rdf:nil
73 N0b2effb21144418cb8397355301f2b86 schema:name Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project
74 rdf:type schema:Organization
75 N1e389cd42ae44084a8e9ec5d6db2bcbc rdf:first N7ee3c0f017b6452d910b4e749ae565ac
76 rdf:rest N2f7219584f124570beaebd610d79f982
77 N22247a7d628b49a8b509049ac8a69b3d schema:name doi
78 schema:value 10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7
79 rdf:type schema:PropertyValue
80 N2ddce14c9cd64985a9147e3c036277f9 schema:issueNumber 4
81 rdf:type schema:PublicationIssue
82 N2f7219584f124570beaebd610d79f982 rdf:first sg:person.012655450625.49
83 rdf:rest N0a00437ee04147019e6a04dcbf9b1bba
84 N6a45f38a1d6446f084bff9f9c04c3ab3 schema:name dimensions_id
85 schema:value pub.1113061682
86 rdf:type schema:PropertyValue
87 N7ee3c0f017b6452d910b4e749ae565ac schema:affiliation grid-institutes:grid.263864.d
88 schema:familyName Chen
89 schema:givenName Bo
90 rdf:type schema:Person
91 Ne06562eb0b9a4aecb7b1438abb743978 schema:volumeNumber 69
92 rdf:type schema:PublicationVolume
93 anzsrc-for:14 schema:inDefinedTermSet anzsrc-for:
94 schema:name Economics
95 rdf:type schema:DefinedTerm
96 anzsrc-for:1402 schema:inDefinedTermSet anzsrc-for:
97 schema:name Applied Economics
98 rdf:type schema:DefinedTerm
99 sg:grant.8325078 http://pending.schema.org/fundedItem sg:pub.10.1007/s00199-019-01187-7
100 rdf:type schema:MonetaryGrant
101 sg:journal.1136838 schema:issn 0938-2259
102 1432-0479
103 schema:name Economic Theory
104 schema:publisher Springer Nature
105 rdf:type schema:Periodical
106 sg:person.011734031152.73 schema:affiliation grid-institutes:grid.9835.7
107 schema:familyName Rietzke
108 schema:givenName David
109 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/discover/publication?and_facet_researcher=ur.011734031152.73
110 rdf:type schema:Person
111 sg:person.012655450625.49 schema:affiliation grid-institutes:grid.5110.5
112 schema:familyName Chen
113 schema:givenName Yu
114 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/discover/publication?and_facet_researcher=ur.012655450625.49
115 rdf:type schema:Person
116 sg:pub.10.1007/978-1-349-01989-2_14 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1007745717
117 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-01989-2_14
118 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
119 sg:pub.10.1007/bf01211443 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1027283872
120 https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01211443
121 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
122 sg:pub.10.1007/bf01212474 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1007766849
123 https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01212474
124 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
125 sg:pub.10.1007/bf01229312 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1031238892
126 https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01229312
127 rdf:type schema:CreativeWork
128 grid-institutes:grid.263864.d schema:alternateName Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, USA
129 schema:name Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, USA
130 rdf:type schema:Organization
131 grid-institutes:grid.5110.5 schema:alternateName Department of Economics, University of Graz, Graz, Austria
132 schema:name Department of Economics, University of Graz, Graz, Austria
133 rdf:type schema:Organization
134 grid-institutes:grid.9835.7 schema:alternateName Department of Economics, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
135 schema:name Department of Economics, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
136 rdf:type schema:Organization
 




Preview window. Press ESC to close (or click here)


...