https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/
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I define Weak Implementation under incomplete information. A social choice set is weakly implementable if the set of equilibrium outcomes of some mechanism is a non-empty subset of the social choice set. Weak implementation is a more natural objective than either full or partial implementation in many cases. I show that there are social choice sets where every subset can be weakly implemented, yet the set cannot be fully implemented. I give a complete characterization of the weakly implementable social choice sets under a weak restriction on preferences. As a corollary, I show that in independent private values environments the set of interim efficient social choice functions is weakly implementable whenever it is partially implementable.
1-26
2019-04-11T11:43
false
2019-02-11
Weak implementation
https://link.springer.com/10.1007%2Fs00199-019-01178-8
en
research_article
2019-02-11
pub.1112074948
dimensions_id
0938-2259
1432-0479
Economic Theory
Studies in Human Society
Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project
readcube_id
79621108edea0f288acb86e669c0621bb7476f0007769594734a890095a88559
Pram
Kym
10.1007/s00199-019-01178-8
doi
Sociology
University of Nevada Reno
University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, NV, USA