Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle
2013-05
AUTHORS ABSTRACTWe consider a variant of the Tullock lottery contest. Each player’s constant marginal cost of effort is drawn from a potentially different continuous distribution. In order to study the impact of incomplete information, we compare three informational settings to each other; players are either completely informed, privately informed about their own costs, or ignorant of all cost realizations. For the first and the third setting, we determine the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Under private information, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium and identify a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Assuming that unit cost distributions all have the same mean, we show that under ignorance of all cost realizations ex ante expected aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Ex ante expected rent dissipation, however, is higher than in the latter settings if we focus on the standard lottery contest and assume costs are all drawn from the same distribution. Between complete and private information, there is neither a general ranking in terms of effort nor in terms of rent dissipation. More... »
PAGES239-268
http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5
DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5
DIMENSIONShttps://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1053611139
JSON-LD is the canonical representation for SciGraph data.
TIP: You can open this SciGraph record using an external JSON-LD service: JSON-LD Playground Google SDTT
[
{
"@context": "https://springernature.github.io/scigraph/jsonld/sgcontext.json",
"about": [
{
"id": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/1402",
"inDefinedTermSet": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/",
"name": "Applied Economics",
"type": "DefinedTerm"
},
{
"id": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/14",
"inDefinedTermSet": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/",
"name": "Economics",
"type": "DefinedTerm"
}
],
"author": [
{
"affiliation": {
"alternateName": "Humboldt University of Berlin",
"id": "https://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.7468.d",
"name": [
"Institute of Economic Theory I, Humboldt University of Berlin, Spandauer Str. 1, 10178, Berlin, Germany"
],
"type": "Organization"
},
"familyName": "Wasser",
"givenName": "C\u00e9dric",
"id": "sg:person.011613171603.02",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/discover/publication?and_facet_researcher=ur.011613171603.02"
],
"type": "Person"
}
],
"citation": [
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s00199-012-0710-6",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1004829767",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-012-0710-6"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s00199-004-0605-2",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1007055124",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0605-2"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00223",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1008207770"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s00199-009-0472-y",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1015271531",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0472-y"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s00199-009-0472-y",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1015271531",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0472-y"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s00199-009-0472-y",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1015271531",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0472-y"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s11127-006-2461-z",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1015423691",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-2461-z"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s11127-006-2461-z",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1015423691",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-006-2461-z"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1023/b:puch.0000024166.63342.09",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1015443549",
"https://doi.org/10.1023/b:puch.0000024166.63342.09"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s00199-011-0622-x",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1015858580",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0622-x"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.1016/s0176-2680(98)00030-5",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1016666471"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.1989.tb00003.x",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1017397978"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.01398.x",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1019306283"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/bf01211819",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1022783576",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01211819"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.09.001",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1023373053"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1023/a:1018391504741",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1027014696",
"https://doi.org/10.1023/a:1018391504741"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.08.005",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1034074062"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00006-1",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1034786826"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00006-1",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1034786826"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.1016/s0047-2727(98)00026-7",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1039566192"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s11127-007-9255-9",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1041205471",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-007-9255-9"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/bf01213906",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1045074156",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213906"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/bf01213906",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1045074156",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01213906"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s10058-007-0032-5",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1045112286",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0032-5"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s10058-007-0032-5",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1045112286",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-007-0032-5"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0517",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1046047724"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s00199-004-0566-5",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1049283033",
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0566-5"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1996.2208",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1051771555"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.3905/jod.1997.407985",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1071559757"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
},
{
"id": "https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.337761",
"sameAs": [
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1102194190"
],
"type": "CreativeWork"
}
],
"datePublished": "2013-05",
"datePublishedReg": "2013-05-01",
"description": "We consider a variant of the Tullock lottery contest. Each player\u2019s constant marginal cost of effort is drawn from a potentially different continuous distribution. In order to study the impact of incomplete information, we compare three informational settings to each other; players are either completely informed, privately informed about their own costs, or ignorant of all cost realizations. For the first and the third setting, we determine the unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. Under private information, we prove existence of a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium and identify a sufficient condition for uniqueness. Assuming that unit cost distributions all have the same mean, we show that under ignorance of all cost realizations ex ante expected aggregate effort is lower than under both private and complete information. Ex ante expected rent dissipation, however, is higher than in the latter settings if we focus on the standard lottery contest and assume costs are all drawn from the same distribution. Between complete and private information, there is neither a general ranking in terms of effort nor in terms of rent dissipation.",
"genre": "research_article",
"id": "sg:pub.10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5",
"inLanguage": [
"en"
],
"isAccessibleForFree": false,
"isPartOf": [
{
"id": "sg:journal.1136838",
"issn": [
"0938-2259",
"1432-0479"
],
"name": "Economic Theory",
"type": "Periodical"
},
{
"issueNumber": "1",
"type": "PublicationIssue"
},
{
"type": "PublicationVolume",
"volumeNumber": "53"
}
],
"name": "Incomplete information in rent-seeking contests",
"pagination": "239-268",
"productId": [
{
"name": "readcube_id",
"type": "PropertyValue",
"value": [
"ff5b57c79d2770765b4f248bb2709bad174b417486dfee4576e4a2a80e57e9c5"
]
},
{
"name": "doi",
"type": "PropertyValue",
"value": [
"10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5"
]
},
{
"name": "dimensions_id",
"type": "PropertyValue",
"value": [
"pub.1053611139"
]
}
],
"sameAs": [
"https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5",
"https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1053611139"
],
"sdDataset": "articles",
"sdDatePublished": "2019-04-11T01:52",
"sdLicense": "https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/",
"sdPublisher": {
"name": "Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project",
"type": "Organization"
},
"sdSource": "s3://com-uberresearch-data-dimensions-target-20181106-alternative/cleanup/v134/2549eaecd7973599484d7c17b260dba0a4ecb94b/merge/v9/a6c9fde33151104705d4d7ff012ea9563521a3ce/jats-lookup/v90/0000000001_0000000264/records_8700_00000483.jsonl",
"type": "ScholarlyArticle",
"url": "http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5"
}
]Download the RDF metadata as: json-ld nt turtle xml License info
JSON-LD is a popular format for linked data which is fully compatible with JSON.
curl -H 'Accept: application/ld+json' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5'
N-Triples is a line-based linked data format ideal for batch operations.
curl -H 'Accept: application/n-triples' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5'
Turtle is a human-readable linked data format.
curl -H 'Accept: text/turtle' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5'
RDF/XML is a standard XML format for linked data.
curl -H 'Accept: application/rdf+xml' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00199-011-0688-5'
This table displays all metadata directly associated to this object as RDF triples.
145 TRIPLES
21 PREDICATES
51 URIs
19 LITERALS
7 BLANK NODES