Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle     


Article Info

DATE

2000-11

AUTHORS

Shinji Ohseto

ABSTRACT

We consider allocation mechanisms in economies with a single indivisible good and money. First, we show that there is no strategy-proof and Pareto efficient mechanism on some preference domains which consist of a sufficiently large but finite number of quasi-linear preferences. Second, we show that there is no strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and equally compensatory mechanism on arbitrary preference domains which consist of more than three quasi-linear preferences. More... »

PAGES

365-374

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s001820000046

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820000046

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1019073096


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