Secure Computation Without Authentication View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle      Open Access: True


Article Info

DATE

2010-09-15

AUTHORS

Boaz Barak, Ran Canetti, Yehuda Lindell, Rafael Pass, Tal Rabin

ABSTRACT

Research on secure multiparty computation has mainly concentrated on the case where the parties can authenticate each other and the communication between them. This work addresses the question of what security can be guaranteed when authentication is not available. We consider a completely unauthenticated setting, where all messages sent by the parties may be tampered with and modified by the adversary without the uncorrupted parties being able to detect this fact. In this model, it is not possible to achieve the same level of security as in the authenticated-channel setting. Nevertheless, we show that meaningful security guarantees can be provided: Essentially, all the adversary can do is to partition the network into disjoint sets, where in each set the computation is secure in of itself, and also independent of the computation in the other sets. In this setting we provide, for the first time, nontrivial security guarantees in a model with no setup assumptions whatsoever. We also obtain similar results while guaranteeing universal composability, in some variants of the common reference string model. Finally, our protocols can be used to provide conceptually simple and unified solutions to a number of problems that were studied separately in the past, including password-based authenticated key exchange and nonmalleable commitments. As an application of our results, we study the question of constructing secure protocols in partially authenticated networks, where some of the links are authenticated, and some are not (as is the case in most networks today). More... »

PAGES

720-760

References to SciGraph publications

  • 2005. Universally Composable Password-Based Key Exchange in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY – EUROCRYPT 2005
  • 1993. Pricing via Processing or Combatting Junk Mail in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY — CRYPTO’ 92
  • 2000-01. Security and Composition of Multiparty Cryptographic Protocols in JOURNAL OF CRYPTOLOGY
  • 2004. Lower Bounds for Concurrent Self Composition in THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY
  • 2000-01. Maintaining Authenticated Communication in the Presence of Break-Ins in JOURNAL OF CRYPTOLOGY
  • 2001-08-02. Universally Composable Commitments in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY — CRYPTO 2001
  • 2007-01-01. Universally Composable Security with Global Setup in THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY
  • 2003-05-13. On the Limitations of Universally Composable Two-Party Computation without Set-up Assumptions in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY — EUROCRYPT 2003
  • 2003. Universal Composition with Joint State in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY - CRYPTO 2003
  • 2004. Simpler Session-Key Generation from Short Random Passwords in THEORY OF CRYPTOGRAPHY
  • 2010. Credential Authenticated Identification and Key Exchange in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY – CRYPTO 2010
  • 2001-08-02. Session-Key Generation Using Human Passwords Only in ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY — CRYPTO 2001
  • Identifiers

    URI

    http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/s00145-010-9075-9

    DOI

    http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00145-010-9075-9

    DIMENSIONS

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