Public information and social choice View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle     


Article Info

DATE

2000-01

AUTHORS

Hans Gersbach

ABSTRACT

We examine the value of public information when a society uses a social choice rule to decide among a set of outcomes. We require that a social choice function satisfies unrestricted domain, non-decisiveness and the Pareto principle. We show that there exist payoff structures for every social choice function, such that an arbitrary subset of voters is worse off by public information. We apply the proposition to collective information acquisition and to irreversible investments. More... »

PAGES

25-31

Journal

TITLE

Social Choice and Welfare

ISSUE

1

VOLUME

17

Author Affiliations

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/pl00007171

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/pl00007171

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1037609297


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