Coalitional Bayesian Nash implementation in differential information economies View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle     


Article Info

DATE

2001-09

AUTHORS

Guangsug Hahn, Nicholas C. Yannelis

ABSTRACT

A mechanism coalitionally implements a social choice set if any outcome of the social choice set can be achieved as a coalitional Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism and vice versa. We say that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if there is a mechanism which coalitionally implements it. Our main theorem proves that a social choice set is coalitionally implementable if and only if it is interim individually rational, interim efficient, coalitional B ayesian incentive compatible, and satisfies a coalitional Bayesian monotonicity condition as well as a closure condition. As an application of our main result, we show that the private core and the private Shapley value of an economy with differential information are coalitionally implementable. More... »

PAGES

485-509

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/pl00004196

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/pl00004196

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1049756790


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