Pigou and Clarke join hands View Full Text


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Article Info

DATE

1993-01

AUTHORS

Hans-Werner Sinn

ABSTRACT

This paper develops a simple, incentive compatible, allocation mechanism by means of which both polluters and pollutees will reveal their preferences so that the government can determine the Pareto optimal pollution level. The mechanism involves a combination of the Pigou tax and the Clarke tax. The two taxes are complementary and together provide a practical solution to the environment problem. The mechanism is applied to the problem of finding the optimal quality of river water which serves both as a waste disposal and as a source of drinking water. More... »

PAGES

79-91

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/bf01053882

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01053882

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1034615736


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