Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle     


Article Info

DATE

1991-07

AUTHORS

Lin Zhou

ABSTRACT

In this paper I prove that in the standard model of 2×n (n≧2) pure exchange economies there is no allocation mechanism that is efficient, non-inversely-dictatorial, and strategy-proof. This strengthens two previous results on this subject by Hurwicz and by Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin.

PAGES

247-254

References to SciGraph publications

  • 1990-03. Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences in SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE
  • Journal

    TITLE

    Social Choice and Welfare

    ISSUE

    3

    VOLUME

    8

    Author Affiliations

    Identifiers

    URI

    http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/bf00177662

    DOI

    http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00177662

    DIMENSIONS

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