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ns1:datePublished "1973-09" ;
ns1:datePublishedReg "1973-09-01" ;
ns1:description "Arrow's theorem is really a theorem about the independence condition. In order to show the very crucial role that this condition plays, the theorem is proved in a refined version, where the use of the Pareto condition is almost avoided. A distinction is made between group preference functions and group decision functions, yielding respectively preference relations and optimal subsets as values. Arrow's theorem is about the first kind, but some ambiguities and mistakes in his book are explained if we assume that he was really thinking of decision functions. The trouble then is that it is not clear how to formulate the independence condition for decision functions. Therefore the next step is to analyse Arrow's argument for accepting the independence condition. The most frequent ambiguity depends on an interpretation of A as the set of all conceivable alternatives, while the variable subset B is the set of all feasible or available alternatives. He then argues that preferences between alternatives that are not feasible shall not influence the choice from the set of available alternatives. But even if this principle is accepted, it only forces us to require independence with respect to some specific set B and not to every B simultaneously. Therefore the independence condition cannot be accepted on these grounds. Another argument is about an election where one of the candidates dies. On one interpretation this argument can be taken to support an independence requirement which leads to a contradiction. On another interpretation it is a condition about connexions between choices from different sets. The so-called problem of binary choice is found to be different from the independence problem and it plays no essential role in Arrow's impossibility result. Other impossibility results by Sen, Batra and Pattanaik and by Schwartz are of a different character. In the last section, several weaker independence conditions are presented. Their relations to Arrow's condition are stated and the arguments supporting them are discussed." ;
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ns1:volumeNumber "4" ],
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ns1:name "The independence condition in the theory of social choice" ;
ns1:pagination "25-49" ;
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ns1:value "10.1007/bf00133397" ] ;
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ns1:name "Philosophy and Religious Studies" .
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ns1:issn "0040-5833",
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ns1:name "Theory and Decision" .
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ns1:familyName "Hansson" ;
ns1:givenName "Bengt" ;
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ns1:alternateName "Lund University" ;
ns1:name "Department of Philosophy, University of Lund, Sweden" .