On the possibility of rational policy evaluation View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:ScholarlyArticle     


Article Info

DATE

1970-10

AUTHORS

Thomas Schwartz

ABSTRACT

Arrow proved the inconsistency of a set of reasonable looking conditions on a social decision rule. These conditions are stated and their rationale explained. It is argued that the blame for the inconsistency must lie with Arrow's Collective Rationality condition. Arrow's abstract problem is generalized and interpreted in terms of individual as well as collective decision-making. His conditions are revised so that (1) cardinal - even interpersonal - utility comparisons are allowed and (2) the Collective Rationality condition - which formulates the traditional conception of rational choice as maximizing choice - is weakened to its bare bones. The revised set of conditions is still inconsistent. Once again the culprit is the Collective Rationality condition, now drastically weakened: even the bare bones of Arrow's conception of rational choice as maximizing choice is untenable. An alternative conception is proposed. More... »

PAGES

89-106

Journal

TITLE

Theory and Decision

ISSUE

1

VOLUME

1

Author Affiliations

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/bf00132454

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00132454

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1043572229


Indexing Status Check whether this publication has been indexed by Scopus and Web Of Science using the SN Indexing Status Tool
Incoming Citations Browse incoming citations for this publication using opencitations.net

JSON-LD is the canonical representation for SciGraph data.

TIP: You can open this SciGraph record using an external JSON-LD service: JSON-LD Playground Google SDTT

[
  {
    "@context": "https://springernature.github.io/scigraph/jsonld/sgcontext.json", 
    "about": [
      {
        "id": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/2203", 
        "inDefinedTermSet": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/", 
        "name": "Philosophy", 
        "type": "DefinedTerm"
      }, 
      {
        "id": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/22", 
        "inDefinedTermSet": "http://purl.org/au-research/vocabulary/anzsrc-for/2008/", 
        "name": "Philosophy and Religious Studies", 
        "type": "DefinedTerm"
      }
    ], 
    "author": [
      {
        "affiliation": {
          "alternateName": "Stanford University", 
          "id": "https://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.168010.e", 
          "name": [
            "Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, USA"
          ], 
          "type": "Organization"
        }, 
        "familyName": "Schwartz", 
        "givenName": "Thomas", 
        "type": "Person"
      }
    ], 
    "datePublished": "1970-10", 
    "datePublishedReg": "1970-10-01", 
    "description": "Arrow proved the inconsistency of a set of reasonable looking conditions on a social decision rule. These conditions are stated and their rationale explained. It is argued that the blame for the inconsistency must lie with Arrow's Collective Rationality condition. Arrow's abstract problem is generalized and interpreted in terms of individual as well as collective decision-making. His conditions are revised so that (1) cardinal - even interpersonal - utility comparisons are allowed and (2) the Collective Rationality condition - which formulates the traditional conception of rational choice as maximizing choice - is weakened to its bare bones. The revised set of conditions is still inconsistent. Once again the culprit is the Collective Rationality condition, now drastically weakened: even the bare bones of Arrow's conception of rational choice as maximizing choice is untenable. An alternative conception is proposed.", 
    "genre": "research_article", 
    "id": "sg:pub.10.1007/bf00132454", 
    "inLanguage": [
      "en"
    ], 
    "isAccessibleForFree": false, 
    "isPartOf": [
      {
        "id": "sg:journal.1026738", 
        "issn": [
          "0040-5833", 
          "1573-7187"
        ], 
        "name": "Theory and Decision", 
        "type": "Periodical"
      }, 
      {
        "issueNumber": "1", 
        "type": "PublicationIssue"
      }, 
      {
        "type": "PublicationVolume", 
        "volumeNumber": "1"
      }
    ], 
    "name": "On the possibility of rational policy evaluation", 
    "pagination": "89-106", 
    "productId": [
      {
        "name": "readcube_id", 
        "type": "PropertyValue", 
        "value": [
          "cf8cc822bcba541e541c0e88abbea6a80969b22fcb392d15fcf3d20284b59e69"
        ]
      }, 
      {
        "name": "doi", 
        "type": "PropertyValue", 
        "value": [
          "10.1007/bf00132454"
        ]
      }, 
      {
        "name": "dimensions_id", 
        "type": "PropertyValue", 
        "value": [
          "pub.1043572229"
        ]
      }
    ], 
    "sameAs": [
      "https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00132454", 
      "https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1043572229"
    ], 
    "sdDataset": "articles", 
    "sdDatePublished": "2019-04-11T13:59", 
    "sdLicense": "https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/", 
    "sdPublisher": {
      "name": "Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project", 
      "type": "Organization"
    }, 
    "sdSource": "s3://com-uberresearch-data-dimensions-target-20181106-alternative/cleanup/v134/2549eaecd7973599484d7c17b260dba0a4ecb94b/merge/v9/a6c9fde33151104705d4d7ff012ea9563521a3ce/jats-lookup/v90/0000000371_0000000371/records_130823_00000004.jsonl", 
    "type": "ScholarlyArticle", 
    "url": "http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00132454"
  }
]
 

Download the RDF metadata as:  json-ld nt turtle xml License info

HOW TO GET THIS DATA PROGRAMMATICALLY:

JSON-LD is a popular format for linked data which is fully compatible with JSON.

curl -H 'Accept: application/ld+json' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/bf00132454'

N-Triples is a line-based linked data format ideal for batch operations.

curl -H 'Accept: application/n-triples' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/bf00132454'

Turtle is a human-readable linked data format.

curl -H 'Accept: text/turtle' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/bf00132454'

RDF/XML is a standard XML format for linked data.

curl -H 'Accept: application/rdf+xml' 'https://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/bf00132454'


 

This table displays all metadata directly associated to this object as RDF triples.

60 TRIPLES      20 PREDICATES      27 URIs      19 LITERALS      7 BLANK NODES

Subject Predicate Object
1 sg:pub.10.1007/bf00132454 schema:about anzsrc-for:22
2 anzsrc-for:2203
3 schema:author N1935be269e08459f8c35afe267ec3245
4 schema:datePublished 1970-10
5 schema:datePublishedReg 1970-10-01
6 schema:description Arrow proved the inconsistency of a set of reasonable looking conditions on a social decision rule. These conditions are stated and their rationale explained. It is argued that the blame for the inconsistency must lie with Arrow's Collective Rationality condition. Arrow's abstract problem is generalized and interpreted in terms of individual as well as collective decision-making. His conditions are revised so that (1) cardinal - even interpersonal - utility comparisons are allowed and (2) the Collective Rationality condition - which formulates the traditional conception of rational choice as maximizing choice - is weakened to its bare bones. The revised set of conditions is still inconsistent. Once again the culprit is the Collective Rationality condition, now drastically weakened: even the bare bones of Arrow's conception of rational choice as maximizing choice is untenable. An alternative conception is proposed.
7 schema:genre research_article
8 schema:inLanguage en
9 schema:isAccessibleForFree false
10 schema:isPartOf N01766fd3a36c47a59690d080120d6816
11 N2a0308ccd1f54360a6bece24cb8300c7
12 sg:journal.1026738
13 schema:name On the possibility of rational policy evaluation
14 schema:pagination 89-106
15 schema:productId N6adfe9f0283a4d2da9852461b941f5ac
16 Nb27f10217aa749f4871519ded95d2955
17 Ndd3c17cc1eff4ce591b012525a840f37
18 schema:sameAs https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1043572229
19 https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00132454
20 schema:sdDatePublished 2019-04-11T13:59
21 schema:sdLicense https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/
22 schema:sdPublisher N805c9840c5f9468da071662b919b8f52
23 schema:url http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF00132454
24 sgo:license sg:explorer/license/
25 sgo:sdDataset articles
26 rdf:type schema:ScholarlyArticle
27 N01766fd3a36c47a59690d080120d6816 schema:issueNumber 1
28 rdf:type schema:PublicationIssue
29 N1935be269e08459f8c35afe267ec3245 rdf:first N1f27d0c03ffc4090bf9622ad6a08ccbc
30 rdf:rest rdf:nil
31 N1f27d0c03ffc4090bf9622ad6a08ccbc schema:affiliation https://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.168010.e
32 schema:familyName Schwartz
33 schema:givenName Thomas
34 rdf:type schema:Person
35 N2a0308ccd1f54360a6bece24cb8300c7 schema:volumeNumber 1
36 rdf:type schema:PublicationVolume
37 N6adfe9f0283a4d2da9852461b941f5ac schema:name doi
38 schema:value 10.1007/bf00132454
39 rdf:type schema:PropertyValue
40 N805c9840c5f9468da071662b919b8f52 schema:name Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project
41 rdf:type schema:Organization
42 Nb27f10217aa749f4871519ded95d2955 schema:name dimensions_id
43 schema:value pub.1043572229
44 rdf:type schema:PropertyValue
45 Ndd3c17cc1eff4ce591b012525a840f37 schema:name readcube_id
46 schema:value cf8cc822bcba541e541c0e88abbea6a80969b22fcb392d15fcf3d20284b59e69
47 rdf:type schema:PropertyValue
48 anzsrc-for:22 schema:inDefinedTermSet anzsrc-for:
49 schema:name Philosophy and Religious Studies
50 rdf:type schema:DefinedTerm
51 anzsrc-for:2203 schema:inDefinedTermSet anzsrc-for:
52 schema:name Philosophy
53 rdf:type schema:DefinedTerm
54 sg:journal.1026738 schema:issn 0040-5833
55 1573-7187
56 schema:name Theory and Decision
57 rdf:type schema:Periodical
58 https://www.grid.ac/institutes/grid.168010.e schema:alternateName Stanford University
59 schema:name Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, USA
60 rdf:type schema:Organization
 




Preview window. Press ESC to close (or click here)


...