Markets for contracts: experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games View Full Text


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Chapter Info

DATE

2001

AUTHORS

Charles R. Plott , Dean V. Williamson

ABSTRACT

The research explores the relationship between games and the economic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concems how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market converges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to a Nash equilibrium. More... »

PAGES

159-180

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/978-3-642-56448-2_9

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-56448-2_9

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1002409291


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