A Note on a Privacy-Preserving Distance-Bounding Protocol View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:Chapter      Open Access: True


Chapter Info

DATE

2011

AUTHORS

Jean-Philippe Aumasson , Aikaterini Mitrokotsa , Pedro Peris-Lopez

ABSTRACT

Distance bounding protocols enable a device to establish an upper bound on the physical distance to a communication partner so as to prevent location spoofing, as exploited by relay attacks. Recently, Rasmussen and Čapkun (ACM-CCS’08) observed that these protocols leak information on the location of the parties to external observers, which is undesirable in a number of applications—for example if the leaked information leads to the identification of the parties among a group of devices. To remedy this problem, these authors proposed a “privacy-preserving” distance bounding protocol, i.e. that leaks no information on the location of the parties. The present paper reports results from an in-depth security analysis of that new protocol, with as main result an attack that recovers the ephemeral secrets as well as the location information of the two parties for particular choices of parameters. Overall, our results do not contradict the preliminary security analysis by the designers, but rather extends it to other parts of the attack surface. More... »

PAGES

78-92

Book

TITLE

Information and Communications Security

ISBN

978-3-642-25242-6
978-3-642-25243-3

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/978-3-642-25243-3_7

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-25243-3_7

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1035219906


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