https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02930-1_35
model
simple reduction
Nash equilibrium
corollary
interaction
players
network generalization
two-person
en
networked economic interactions
mixed Nash equilibrium
incident edges
economic interactions
payoffs
theorem
game
chapters
generalization
false
graphical games
such games
approach
linear program
edge
sum
minmax theorem
endpoints/players
2009-01-01
We consider graphical games in which the edges are zero-sum games between the endpoints/players; the payoff of a player is the sum of the payoffs from each incident edge. Such games are arguably very broad and useful models of networked economic interactions. We give a simple reduction of such games to two-person zero-sum games; as a corollary, a mixed Nash equilibrium can be computed efficiently by solving a linear program and rounding off the results. Our results render polynomially efficient, and simplify considerably, the approach in [3].
2022-01-01T19:15
https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/
useful model
equilibrium
2009
chapter
On a Network Generalization of the Minmax Theorem
reduction
program
423-434
results
zero-sum game
Yossi
Matias
978-3-642-02930-1
978-3-642-02929-5
Automata, Languages and Programming
Microsoft Research New England, USA
Microsoft Research New England, USA
Albers
Susanne
Artificial Intelligence and Image Processing
Sotiris
Nikoletseas
10.1007/978-3-642-02930-1_35
doi
Marchetti-Spaccamela
Alberto
Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project
Constantinos
Daskalakis
Wolfgang
Thomas
pub.1009551474
dimensions_id
Information and Computing Sciences
Christos H.
Papadimitriou
U.C. Berkeley, USA
U.C. Berkeley, USA
Springer Nature