2019-04-16T05:31
https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/
We prove the unconditional security of a quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol on a noisy channel against the most general attack allowed by quantum physics. We use the fact that in a previous paper we have reduced the proof of the unconditionally security of this QKD protocol to a proof that a corresponding Quantum String Oblivious Transfer (String-QOT) protocol would be unconditionally secure against Bob if implemented on top of an unconditionally secure bit commitment scheme. We prove a lemma that extends a security proof given by Yao for a (one bit) QOT protocol to this String-QOT protocol. This result and the reduction mentioned above implies the unconditional security of our QKD protocol despite our previous proof that unconditionally secure bit commitment schemes are impossible.
chapters
en
Quantum Key Distribution and String Oblivious Transfer in Noisy Channels
2001-07-13
2001-07-13
343-357
https://link.springer.com/10.1007%2F3-540-68697-5_26
chapter
true
doi
10.1007/3-540-68697-5_26
University of Montreal
DIRO, Université de Montréal, C.P. 6128, Succursale CENTRE-VILLE, H3C 3J7, Montréal, Québec, Canada
Koblitz
Neal
Physical Sciences
978-3-540-61512-5
978-3-540-68697-2
Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’96
Dominic
Mayers
955252a69e028c95194d45ef78cb188f392fb9ab54527ed2c24fc950577674df
readcube_id
Quantum Physics
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Berlin, Heidelberg
pub.1031344906
dimensions_id
Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project