Validation of Elliptic Curve Public Keys View Full Text


Ontology type: schema:Chapter      Open Access: True


Chapter Info

DATE

2002-12-18

AUTHORS

Adrian Antipa , Daniel Brown , Alfred Menezes , René Struik , Scott Vanstone

ABSTRACT

We present practical and realistic attacks on some standardized elliptic curve key establishment and public-key encryption protocols that are effective if the receiver of an elliptic curve point does not check that the point lies on the appropriate elliptic curve. The attacks combine ideas from the small subgroup attack of Lim and Lee, and the differential fault attack of Biehl, Meyer and Müller. Although the ideas behind the attacks are quite elementary, and there are simple countermeasures known, the attacks can have drastic consequences if these countermeasures are not taken by implementors of the protocols. We illustrate the effectiveness of such attacks on a key agreement protocol recently proposed for the IEEE 802.15 Wireless Personal Area Network (WPAN) standard. More... »

PAGES

211-223

Book

TITLE

Public Key Cryptography — PKC 2003

ISBN

978-3-540-00324-3
978-3-540-36288-3

Identifiers

URI

http://scigraph.springernature.com/pub.10.1007/3-540-36288-6_16

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-36288-6_16

DIMENSIONS

https://app.dimensions.ai/details/publication/pub.1016032292


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