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    "datePublished": "2006", 
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    "description": "We address the message authentication problem in two seemingly different communication models. In the first model, the sender and receiver are connected by an insecure channel and by a low-bandwidth auxiliary channel, that enables the sender to \u201cmanually\u201d authenticate one short message to the receiver (for example, by typing a short string or comparing two short strings). We consider this model in a setting where no computational assumptions are made, and prove that for any 0 < \u03b5< 1 there exists a log*n-round protocol for authenticating n-bit messages, in which only 2 log(1 /\u03b5) + O(1) bits are manually authenticated, and any adversary (even computationally unbounded) has probability of at most \u03b5 to cheat the receiver into accepting a fraudulent message. Moreover, we develop a proof technique showing that our protocol is essentially optimal by providing a lower bound of 2 log(1/ \u03b5) \u2013 6 on the required length of the manually authenticated string.The second model we consider is the traditional message authentication model. In this model the sender and the receiver share a short secret key; however, they are connected only by an insecure channel. Once again, we apply our proof technique, and prove a lower bound of 2 log(1/ \u03b5) \u2013 2 on the required Shannon entropy of the shared key. This settles an open question posed by Gemmell and Naor (CRYPTO \u201993).Finally, we prove that one-way functions are essential (and sufficient) for the existence of protocols breaking the above lower bounds in the computational setting.", 
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    "name": "Tight Bounds for Unconditional Authentication Protocols in the Manual Channel and Shared Key Models", 
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