playful name
Wittgenstein
fundamental computational problem
advent
philosophy
hand
intention
game theory
algorithm
predictable reflex
values
salient themes
game
different contexts
system
concept
efficient method
problem
outcomes
https://scigraph.springernature.com/explorer/license/
computational problems
2005
corpus
desirable outcomes
theory of games
method
family
philosophy of language
price of anarchy
face of situations
behavior
group
algorithmic mechanism design
multi-staged threats
interface
area
example
divergent meanings
Concurrency community
talk
theory of algorithms
context
design
2022-01-01T19:17
NASH
5-5
situation
recent years
prices
people
selfish agents
correctness
years
mechanism design
en
degree
results
open problem
meaning
community
model
mathematical model
anarchy
endeavor
false
ideal optimum design
active interface
recent results
complexity
research problem
Games Other People Play
research community
efficient algorithm
interaction
language
quest
themes
reflex
fundamental values
https://doi.org/10.1007/11539452_4
2005-01-01
name
threat
point
agents
Internet
reults
face
optimum design
Games were used by Wittgenstein as an example in the philosophy of language of a concept that can have many and dramatically divergent meanings in different contexts.Case in point: Games are familiar in the Concurrency community as models of dynamic, multi-staged threats to correctness. In Economics, on the other hand, games refer to a family of mathematical models (including, strictly speaking, the games alluded to above) whose intention is to model the behavior of rational, selfish agents in the face of situations that are to varying degrees competitive and cooperative. In recent years there has been an increasingly active interface, motivated by the advent of the Internet, between the theory of games on the one hand, and the theory of algorithms and complexity on the other, and both with networking. This corpus of research problems and reults is already quite extensive, rich, and diverse; however, one can identify in it at least three salient themes: First, there is the endeavor of developing efficient algorithms for the fundamental computational problems associated with games, such as finding Nash and other equilibria; this quest is more than the predictable reflex of our research community, but it is arguably of fundamental value to Game Theory at large. There is also the field of algorithmic mechanism design, striving to devise computationally efficient methods for designing games whose equilibria are precisely the socially desirable outcomes (for example, that the person who has the highest personal appreciation for the item being auctioned actually wins the auction). And finally we have an ever-expanding family of problems collectively given the playful name “the price of anarchy,” studying how much worse a system emerging from the spontaneous interaction of a group of selfish agents can be when compared with the ideal optimum design.This talk will review recent results and open problems in these areas.
equilibrium
economics
chapter
theory
chapters
spontaneous interaction
family of problems
cases
field
Information and Computing Sciences
doi
10.1007/11539452_4
Springer Nature - SN SciGraph project
978-3-540-31934-4
CONCUR 2005 – Concurrency Theory
978-3-540-28309-6
Computation Theory and Mathematics
de Alfaro
Luca
Abadi
Martín
University of California, Berkeley
University of California, Berkeley
dimensions_id
pub.1053019977
Christos H.
Papadimitriou
Springer Nature