Creation of elucidation and application technique of the nature of the structure and the information propagation in the micro-blog network View Homepage


Ontology type: schema:MonetaryGrant     


Grant Info

YEARS

2010-2012

FUNDING AMOUNT

2100000 JPY

ABSTRACT

This year went to the analysis of indirect reciprocity of mathematical models of a group with a group structure (study A), the analysis of mathematical models of the evolutionary game dynamics of indirect reciprocity as a social system the (study B). Study A was published in the peer-reviewed international journals. Research B is in the process of continuing the analysis. In Study A, even if the individual is in the case where there is a group structure in the sharing of information in an indirect reciprocity does not depend on the group society It revealed that according to in-group favoritism unintended even though occurs in the Code of Conduct. in particular, the extent of such in-group favoritism under the social norms called Kandori becomes stronger. in study B, society to share the reputation information the analysis of the mathematical model of the system. Because it takes cost for the maintenance of such social institutions (for example, seller rating system in the Internet auction), free rider may appear not to pay the maintenance costs of the social system. Therefore, this is a kind of public goods. We devised a mathematical model of the maintenance mechanism of reputation information sharing system as such public goods were analyzed. In the model, think of the player population of social dilemma game, two of reputation information sharing system to compete with each other. The two institutions as a strategy, with the probability of observing a player over the cost, the tax amount to the player to use the system. The strategy of the players, think and unconditional cooperation and unconditional non-cooperation strategy do not use the system, use the system (the tax payment) and the strategy to distinguish the reputation. The co-evolution dynamics of these plans and the player was numerically investigated. As a result, it was revealed that the cooperative population is maintained when the rate of evolution of the player's strategy is sufficiently slow for the evolution rate of the system. This effect is known as the Red King effect. More... »

URL

https://kaken.nii.ac.jp/grant/KAKENHI-PROJECT-10J08999

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